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I. Introduction
Capital accounts play a central role in partner-
ship taxation. Under some circumstances, partners
are permitted to have negative capital accounts.
Outside Hubert I1 and Hubert II,2 there has been little
discussion of negative capital accounts in the tax
context and almost no discussion in the nontax
context. Nontax law, however, is critically impor-
tant. This report provides an integrated discussion
of the application of tax and nontax law to negative
capital accounts.
One of the challenges in writing this report is that
it requires a discussion of both the at-risk rules of
section 465 and the debt allocation rules of section
752. Complex issues involving sections 465 and 752
and their interaction are worthy of their own ar-
ticles. Indeed, others have written those articles.3 In
this report, I endeavor to stay focused on the
negative capital account issues. So although I am
forced to make forays into sections 465 and 752, I try
to keep them restrained.
Partnerships for federal tax purposes normally
include state law partnerships and limited liability
companies with two or more members.4 Any dis-
cussion of LLCs in this report assumes they are
classified as partnerships and that their members
are classified as partners for federal tax purposes.
Further, in my discussion of section 465, I do not
cite or consider the 1979 section 465 proposed
regulations. (It is hard to see why proposed regula-
tions from over 35 years ago should be given any
credence. They often conflict with case law;5 even
the IRS reasons differently from them;6 and other
1Hubert Enterprises v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 72 (2005), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, and remanded, 230 Fed. Appx. 526 (6th Cir.
2007).
2Hubert Enterprises Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-46
(remand decision).
3See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, ‘‘Illusory DROs: At Risk Lessons
From Hubert,’’ Tax Notes, Jan. 21, 2008, p. 405 (Burke 2008); and
Susan Kalinka, ‘‘Hubert Enterprises: LLC Members, Partners,
Deficit Restoration Obligations, and the At-Risk Rules,’’ Tax
Notes, July 10, 2006, p. 137. See also Ajay Gupta, ‘‘Who’s at Risk?
Abbott and Costello Take on Section 465,’’ 17 U. Miami Bus. L.
Rev. 47 (2008) (a 109-page behemoth that looks at a variety of
associated issues).
4See reg. section 301.7701-2. An LLC can elect to be taxed as
a C corporation or an S corporation. Reg. section 301.7701-3(g).
Under section 7704, most publicly traded limited partnerships
are taxed as C corporations.
5Compare prop. reg. section 1.465-22(a), with Melvin v. Com-
missioner, 88 T.C. 63, 75 (1987), aff’d, 894 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1990).
6Compare prop. reg. section 1.465-6(d), with ILM 201308028.
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writers often pay them little heed.7) Finally, unless
otherwise indicated, when I discuss a capital ac-
count deficit restoration obligation (DRO), an actual
DRO is meant. As explained in the primer (the
Appendix), in the nonrecourse debt context, it is
possible to have a deemed DRO that does not
involve an obligation of a partner to make a finan-
cial contribution to the partnership.
II. Hubert Confusion
A. The Basics
In Hubert I, the Tax Court concluded that the
DRO of an LLC member (who was a partner for tax
purposes) did not increase the member’s amount at
risk under section 465.8 That decision was vacated
by the Sixth Circuit because the Tax Court failed to
apply the ‘‘payer of last resort’’ standard (discussed
below). The Tax Court in Hubert II, on remand,
purported to apply the Sixth Circuit standard and
came to the same conclusion.9 Sadly, the case mis-
understands important areas of law. (At times I will
refer to both cases together as Hubert.)
Section 465 is a disallowance provision. It denies
taxpayers loss deductions that other code sections
otherwise permit. To simplify a bit, section 465 was
enacted to prevent taxpayers from taking loss de-
ductions attributable to specific nonrecourse debt.10
Generally, section 465(a) provides that individuals
and some closely held corporations are allowed to
take a loss deduction from an activity only to the
extent of the taxpayer’s amount at risk for the tax
year in that activity, with any disallowed loss
carried forward until a sufficient amount at risk is
developed.11 The amount at risk includes money
contributed by the taxpayer; the basis of property
contributed by the taxpayer; and amounts bor-
rowed for use in the activity for which the taxpayer
has unprotected personal liability or, alternatively,
for which the taxpayer has provided property as
security if the property is not used in the activity.12
Thus, nonrecourse debt generally does not increase
the amount at risk.13 As the Tax Court has noted, the
critical inquiry is who is the obligor of last resort
when the partnership fails.14 Thus, for example, a
taxpayer is not at risk under the above rules if she
agrees to be liable on recourse debt but is entitled to
reimbursement from someone else should she be
required to pay on the debt.15 But if she has
unprotected exposure, she can be at risk to that
extent. Note that the rules for calculating a partner’s
basis in the partnership interest or capital account
are not keyed to the at-risk rules. So even if the
at-risk rules deny a tax deduction to a partner, the
deduction still reduces the partner’s basis in the
partnership interest and the partner’s capital ac-
count.
In the Sixth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction the
Hubert taxpayers resided, the question is ‘‘whether,
in a worst case scenario, the individual taxpayer
will suffer any personal, out-of-pocket expenses.’’16
Thus, in the Sixth Circuit, it does not have to be
probable, for example, that a partner will end up
7See Burke 2008, supra note 3, and Kalinka, supra note 3, in
which the proposed regulations get only the odd mention.
8I do not focus on the original Tax Court decision given that
it was vacated, but the court’s reasoning regarding DROs was
vacuous. In concluding that the taxpayer was not at risk under
section 465, the court stated: ‘‘As observed by respondent, [the
LLC agreement] contains a condition that must be met before
the deficit capital account restoration obligation arises. In accor-
dance with that condition, an [LLC] member must first liquidate
its interest in [the LLC] before the member has any obligation to
the entity. Neither [of the taxpayers] liquidated its interest in
[the LLC] during the relevant years.’’ Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 106. To
be at risk under section 465, the taxpayer needs personal
liability in the current year; she does not need to make payment
in the current year. See section 465(b)(2). As I discuss below,
there may need to be a realistic possibility of payment, but the
mere fact that there is a condition precedent, such as a liquida-
tion of a member’s interest, does not prevent liability from
arising. There is always some sort of condition precedent to
payment, e.g., default by the LLC or demand by the creditor.
That the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision suggests that it, too,
was unimpressed by the Tax Court’s reasoning. See Richard M.
Lipton, ‘‘At-Risk Rules and DROs: Did the Tax Court Err in
Hubert Enterprises?’’ 103 J. Tax’n 325 (2005).
9For a more detailed discussion of the case, see Steven Kline
and Stephen Looney, ‘‘Hubert II Enterprises Revisited,’’ Bus.
Entities (May/June 2008); and Blake Rubin, Andrea Whiteway,
and Jon Finkelstein, ‘‘Tax Court Sticks to Its Guns and Sticks It
to the Taxpayers in Hubert II Case,’’ ALI-CLE course materials
(Sept. 26-27, 2013). See also Lipton and Todd Golub, ‘‘Hubert
Enterprises Part II: We Can ‘Guarantee’ a Better Result,’’ 109 J.
Tax’n 14 (2008); Rubin, Whiteway, and Finkelstein, ‘‘Hubert II
Enterprises, Inc.: Does a Capital Account Deficit Restoration
Obligation Increase a Partner’s At-Risk Amount on Share of
Liabilities,’’ 9 J. Passthrough Entities ___ (2006); and Rubin,
Whiteway, and Finkelstein, ‘‘Sixth Circuit Reverses Controver-
sial Hubert Case Dealing With Partner’s Amount at Risk,’’ 10 J.
Passthrough Entities 9 (July-Aug. 2007).
10See Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon, and Lawrence A.
Zelenak, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals, para. 19 (2002).
11Section 465(a).
12Section 465(b). Generally, amounts borrowed are not con-
sidered at risk if borrowed from a person with an interest in the
activity or from a person related to a person (other than the
taxpayer) with an interest in the activity. See Pritchett v. Commis-
sioner, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987); Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
1471 (1986); and Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360 (1986).
13There is an exception for qualified nonrecourse financing,
which is mostly nonrecourse debt secured by real property and
borrowed from a commercial lender. See section 465(b)(6).
14Melvin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 63, 75 (1987), aff’d, 894 F.2d
1072 (9th Cir. 1990).
15Section 465(b)(4).
16Pledger v. United States, 236 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2000). See
Emershaw v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1991).
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having to pay on a partnership debt. She will be at
risk to the extent she has unprotected personal
liability on the debt in a worst-case scenario. Several
other circuits and the Tax Court apply a ‘‘realistic
possibility’’ test, discussed below.17
Hubert involved an equipment leasing LLC (LCL)
formed in Wyoming in 1998.18 LCL was treated as a
partnership for tax purposes. Its two members,
HBW Inc. and Hubert Commerce Center Inc., were
part of a group of affiliated corporations whose
common parent was owned by a family trust. As
closely held corporations, the members were sub-
ject to the at-risk rules. LCL purchased equipment
with promissory notes, some of which were nonre-
course and others of which were partially recourse.
Under these facts, only the recourse portion of the
notes could give rise to an at-risk amount. But the
members of the LLC did not sign or guarantee the
notes. Because LLC members are not liable for the
obligations of the LLC,19 without more, the mem-
bers had no liability on the LLC’s recourse indebt-
edness and thus no amount at risk.20
But there was more. The LLC agreement was
amended to add the following standard-issue DRO:
Deficit Capital Account Restoration. If any
Partner has a deficit Capital Account following
the liquidation of his, her or its interest in the
partnership, then he, she or it shall restore the
amount of such deficit balance to the Partner-
ship by the end of such taxable year or, if later,
within 90 days after the date of such liquida-
tion, for payment to creditors or distribution to
Partners with positive capital account bal-
ances.21
For years postdating the amendment, the court
had to address whether the DRO could create an
amount at risk. The taxpayer’s argument was essen-
tially that in a worst-case scenario, the taxpayer
would have to restore a negative capital account
(potentially created by the loss allocations gener-
ated by the recourse portions of the debt) and that
those amounts could be used to pay creditors. Thus,
the taxpayer argued that it was at risk on the
recourse indebtedness to the extent of the DRO.
B. The Tax Court’s Erroneous Reasoning
In Hubert II, the Tax Court gave two main reasons
why the DRO did not create an amount at risk. The
first was that a creditor cannot force the LLC to
liquidate. Wyo. Stat. Ann. section 17-15-123, appli-
cable to the case but now repealed, governed when
an LLC was dissolved. It is true that the statute did
not give creditors the right to cause a dissolution of
an LLC. However, the court went so far as to state
that ‘‘LCL could not be made to liquidate by a
creditor in any circumstance, not even by a creditor
that forced LCL into receivership or bankruptcy.’’
That is simply wrong. As the Supreme Court re-
cently observed, state law cannot trump federal
bankruptcy law.22 Indeed, federal bankruptcy pre-
emption is one of the few enumerated powers
granted to Congress by the Constitution.23 Credi-
tors can force an LLC into a chapter 7 bankruptcy,
and the LLC can be liquidated by the bankruptcy
trustee, thereby potentially triggering member
DROs.24 And the potential for this to happen is well
short of the Sixth Circuit’s worst-case scenario;
three or more creditors (or a single creditor if there
are fewer than 12 creditors overall) holding at least
17See Levy v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 838 (1988); and Wag-a-Bag
Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-581. The following are
circuit court decisions that apply an economic reality test and
deny that a taxpayer is at risk if a transaction is structured so
that it removes any realistic possibility that the taxpayer will
suffer an economic loss: Waters v. Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1310,
1316-1317 (2d Cir. 1992); Young v. Commissioner, 926 F.2d 1083,
1089 (11th Cir. 1991); Moser v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1040, 1048
n.21 (8th Cir. 1990); and American Principals Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 904 F.2d 477, 482-483 (9th Cir. 1990). See also
Kingston v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-512.
18Interestingly, it was formed under the original Wyoming
LLC act, which ultimately gave rise to the LLC revolution. See
Susan Hamill, ‘‘The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Com-
pany,’’ 59 Ohio State L.J. 1459 (1998).
19At the time, the relevant rule was in Wyo. Stat. Ann. section
17-15-113 (2007). See Carter Bishop and Daniel Kleinberger,
‘‘Limited Liability Companies,’’ Tax and Business Law, para. 1.01.
20Those types of liabilities, recourse to the LLC but not to the
members, are sometimes called exculpatory liabilities if they are
unsecured. They raise several complex issues. See Burke, ‘‘Ex-
culpatory Liabilities and Partnership Nonrecourse Allocations,’’
57 Tax Law. 33 (2003) (Burke 2003).
21Hubert II, T.C. Memo. 2008-46, at *6.
22See Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct.
1938 (2016).
23Article I, section 8, clause 4 states that Congress shall have
the power to pass ‘‘uniform Laws on the subject of Bankrupt-
cies.’’ In my 30-plus years of teaching and scholarship, this may
be the first time I have made a citation to the Constitution that
was not to the 16th Amendment. The credit for this unique
opportunity goes to professor Scott Ehrlich of California West-
ern School of Law, who teaches bankruptcy law and schooled
me on the relevant provisions. In Burke 2008, supra note 3, at the
text accompanying note 104 of that article, Burke states that ‘‘the
remote possibility that a bankruptcy trustee might be permitted
to enforce the members’ DROs should not suffice to render the
obligation unconditional for purposes of sections 704(b) and
752,’’ and she cites reg. section 1.752-2(b)(3), although reg.
section 1.752-2(b)(4) is actually meant, which disregards contin-
gent obligations that are unlikely to be discharged until a future
event occurs. As much as I respect Burke as a scholar, the
possibility of a bankruptcy trustee enforcing a DRO strikes me,
more often than not, as a probability. I think it would be a virtual
certainty in many fact patterns.
24See Bankruptcy Code section 303; see also Peter J. Lahny IV,
4-41 Debtor Creditor Law, section 41.02.
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$15,000 in debt can file an involuntary petition if the
debtor is generally not paying debts as they come
due.25
Further, it is not clear from the LLC agreement
whether the DRO was triggered by a state law
liquidation or tax liquidation. Many tax profession-
als likely would assume the latter. As discussed in
the primer, the whole idea of a DRO provision
principally comes from tax law — that is, the
regulations under section 704(b), which address
when allocations of partnership items of income
and deduction are allowed.26 Under section 708 and
its regulations, a liquidation occurs when a partner-
ship ceases to be a going concern.27 Thus, even
putting aside bankruptcy law, if tax liquidation was
meant in the Hubert DRO provision, LCL and its
members did not have complete control over
whether liquidation occurred. If LCL failed or
ceased operations for other reasons, it could be
deemed liquidated and the DROs could be trig-
gered. Although it would not be creditors forcing
the liquidation in that scenario, it still means that
forces beyond the control of LCL or its members
could trigger a liquidation and the DROs. This
undermines the reasoning of the court.28
The second reason the Hubert II court gave for its
conclusions was that a DRO need not match a
member’s unpaid share of the recourse indebted-
ness. Although the math can sometimes get tricky,
assuming no distributions, it is often the existence
of debt that allows a partner to develop a negative
capital account. As discussed in the primer, any
money or property contributed by the partner gives
rise to a positive capital account balance and a
positive outside basis. Debt increases the outside
basis but not the capital account. And under section
704(d), a partner may not deduct losses exceeding
her outside basis.29 In what is likely the most typical
case, for a capital account to be negative, recourse
or nonrecourse debt must be generating deduc-
tions. That is when the Sixth Circuit’s worst-case
scenario comes into play. In the abstract, it is indeed
difficult to predict why a given partner’s capital
account might be negative. Perhaps she got a dis-
proportionate share of loss allocations, perhaps it
was because of deductions attributable to nonre-
course debt, or perhaps she received a distribution.
But in a worst-case scenario, it is of course possible
(and often probable) that the recourse debt would
force the capital account to go negative and enforce-
ment of the DRO would provide the funds neces-
sary to pay the recourse debt. Indeed, before Hubert
II, tax practitioners widely assumed that a DRO
created an at-risk amount for this very reason. Thus,
the Tax Court’s analysis appears to contradict the
Sixth Circuit standard, which it was supposed to
apply.
The Tax Court also reasoned that the DRO by its
terms does not require that the amount contributed
be paid to creditors because it could be paid to
partners with positive capital account balances.
That is again wrong, at least if the LLC does not
want to violate debtor-creditor law. An LLC cannot
prefer a member to a creditor. It must pay its
creditors before its members if it is insolvent or if a
distribution to a member would render it insol-
vent.30
But it gets better. The court also stated:
If a member of a limited liability company is
automatically ‘‘at risk’’ for repayment of the
company’s recourse debt simply by inserting a
DRO in the operating agreement in order to
meet the requirements of section 704(b), then
25See Bankruptcy Code section 303(b) and (h).
26See reg. section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii); and Rubin, Whiteway, and
Finkelstein, ‘‘Tax Court Sticks,’’ supra note 9, which also dis-
cusses this issue.
27Reg. section 1.708-1(b)(1) provides that ‘‘a partnership shall
terminate when the operations of the partnership are discontin-
ued and no part of any business, financial operation, or venture
of the partnership continues to be carried on by any of its
partners in a partnership.’’
28See Rubin, Whiteway, and Finkelstein, ‘‘Tax Court Sticks,’’
supra note 9, which also discusses this issue.
29See infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
30The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(RULLCA) section 405 provides limitations on distributions,
and RULLCA section 406 sets forth the liability of members and
managers for making an improper distribution. RULLCA sec-
tion 405(a) states that a distribution may not be made if it
renders the LLC insolvent. The tougher question is who may
enforce the liability under RULLCA section 406, because the
liability is to the LLC and presumably the errant members or
managers are not going to enforce it against themselves. So a
creditor may need to seek to have a receiver appointed for the
LLC who can then claw back the improper distributions to the
LLC or place the LLC into an involuntary bankruptcy and get
the trustee to do the clawback.
Further, a distribution while the LLC is insolvent or that
would render it insolvent is an ‘‘avoidable transaction’’ (the new
term for a ‘‘fraudulent transfer’’) under the Uniform Voidable
Transactions Act (UVTA), aka the 2014 revisions to the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. If the distribution was intended to
defeat the LLC’s creditors, it is an avoidable transaction under
UVTA section 4(a). If the LLC was rendered insolvent, it is an
avoidable transaction under UVTA section 5(a). The Wyoming
law that applied when the case arose is mostly consistent with
the above. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. section 17-15-121(d) (1977) (now
repealed); and Wyo. Stat. Ann. sections 34-14-205 and 34-14-206
(1977). See Harvey Gelb, ‘‘Liabilities of Members and Managers
of Wyoming Limited Liability Companies,’’ 31 Land & Water L.
Rev. 133 (1996). See also Dale W. Cottam et al., ‘‘The 2010
Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act: A Uniform Recipe
With Wyoming ‘Home Cooking,’’’ 11 Wyo. L. Rev. 49 (2011).
Many thanks to Jay Adkisson, who knows more about debtor-
creditor law than I could ever hope to (or want to) and helped
me write this footnote.
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the at-risk rules of section 465 have little
purpose in that seemingly every member of a
limited liability company is at risk for the
repayment of the company’s recourse debt.31
Here the court demonstrates a fundamental lack
of understanding of partnership tax law. Partners
do not lightly agree to DROs. Attorneys often do
not want their clients to agree to them precisely
because of the underlying liability exposure.32 The
regulations provide their rules on DROs precisely
so an allocation to a partner can have economic
effect (that is, have a real economic impact).33 As
discussed below, I agree that in some circumstances
the mere existence of a DRO might not give rise to
an at-risk amount, but the court seems to treat
DROs as some sort of superfluous boilerplate.
DROs are far from that and far from routine.
Would it make a difference if instead of a worst-
case scenario standard, a more rigorous test were
applied? The Tax Court and most circuits have held
that there must be a ‘‘realistic possibility’’ that a
taxpayer will be liable on recourse debt in order to
be at risk.34 The cases that concluded that a taxpayer
was not at risk on recourse debt under the realistic
possibility test involved complex circular leasing
structures with underlying nonrecourse debt and
other protections, making it indeed unlikely that
the taxpayer would have to pay on the recourse
debt. None of those cases discussed DROs, and they
are a far cry from the Hubert position that the
existence of a DRO by definition cannot create an
amount at risk. A realistic possibility cannot mean
probability or else only businesses likely to fail
would have at-risk amounts under section 465.
Hubert involved both nonrecourse and recourse
notes. In general, if an LLC owns properties secured
by recourse and nonrecourse debt, it is not at all
unlikely that if the LLC’s business fails, the credi-
tors would foreclose on the properties to ‘‘collect’’
on the nonrecourse indebtedness and sue on the
recourse debt (possibly without foreclosure if fore-
closure on the nonrecourse debt exhausted the
available collateral). In a failed business scenario, it
is not only possible but probable that the LLC
would be forced to liquidate through a voluntary or
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. And upon liq-
uidation, members would be called on to restore
their deficit capital accounts, with the amounts
contributed used to pay the outstanding recourse
indebtedness. Thus, it could have been a very
realistic possibility in Hubert that the amounts paid
by the members under their DROs would be used
to pay the recourse indebtedness.
A more detailed look: In the LLC setting, what
counts as recourse debt and nonrecourse debt gets
tricky because debt can be recourse to the LLC but
be nonrecourse to the members, who, in their
capacity as members, have no liability on LLC
recourse debt (often called exculpatory debt35). Oth-
ers have addressed this area, and I will not revisit it
in detail here, but baseline classification of debt as
recourse or nonrecourse is important.36 Although I
will discuss the section 752 regulations below, for
now it is important to note that it is possible under
those regulations for a debt to be recourse to the
extent of obligations under DROs.37
The next part of this discussion assumes that the
nominal LLC recourse debt in fact counts as re-
course debt under section 752 to the extent of DROs
and that any LLC nonrecourse debt is secured by
property.38 Keeping those assumptions in mind,
recall that both nonrecourse and recourse debt can
cause a capital account to go negative.39 If the
business fails, foreclosure of the property securing
the nonrecourse debt will generate gain if the
amount of the nonrecourse debt exceeds the basis of
the property, as often will be the case and almost
certainly will be the case if nonrecourse debt caused
the capital account to go negative.40 To oversimplify
somewhat, that gain will commonly eliminate the
deficit in the capital account attributable to the
nonrecourse debt.41 Assuming no distributions —
unlikely to be made if a business is failing — any
negative capital account remaining will necessarily
be attributable to the recourse debt, and when the
members restore the deficit capital account, the
amount paid must be used to pay the recourse
creditors. This is true both under debtor-creditor
law and under the Hubert DRO language, which by
31Hubert II, T.C. Memo. 2008-46, at *18.
32See Kline and Looney, supra note 9; all my coauthors of
Richard M. Lipton et al., Partnership Taxation (2012), tell me they
avoid DROs.
33See infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
34Waters, 978 F.2d at 1316-1317; Young, 926 F.2d at 1089;
Moser, 914 F.2d at 1048 n.21; and American Principals Leasing
Corp., 904 F.2d at 482-483.
35See Burke 2003, supra note 20.
36Id.; Burke 2008, supra note 3. See also Michael A. Oberst,
‘‘The Disappearing Limited Deficit Restoration Obligation,’’ 56
Tax Law. 485 (2003).
37See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
38For ‘‘true’’ nonrecourse debt, partners normally do not
have a DRO but are allowed to have negative capital accounts to
the extent of their share of minimum gain. See infra notes
133-149 and accompanying text.
39See infra notes 118-149 and accompanying text.
40Tufts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
41I am resisting the temptation to bury the reader in the
details of the regulations on the allocation of nonrecourse
deductions in reg. section 1.704-2. But note that the regulations
focus on book gain, which need not be identical to tax gain. See
Lipton et al., supra note 32, at para. 5.07.
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its terms specifically allowed contributed funds to
be used to pay creditors. This sequence of events,
while complex, need not be at all unrealistic or a
stretch. Thus, even under the more rigorous realistic
possibility test, the taxpayers’ DROs could have
created an amount at risk.
That said, when recourse debt, secured nonre-
course debt, and perhaps exculpatory debt are
involved, the analysis can get very complicated.
The exact terms of the relevant promissory notes
need to be analyzed, as do the tax consequences of
any deemed liquidation of the partnership. My
analysis assumes that because of the DROs, some
debt will be classified as recourse. That will often be
true, particularly because creditors can force a part-
nership into bankruptcy and thus trigger the DROs.
But it is not an inevitability. If nominal recourse
debt has priority as to partnership assets over
nonrecourse debt, the assets may be sufficient to
pay the recourse debt. In that case, there may be
nothing left for the nonrecourse creditors to receive,
making the cancellation of the nonrecourse debt
cancellation of indebtedness (COD) income.42 A
true nonrecourse creditor should not be able to
enforce a DRO because that would have the effect of
making nonrecourse debt recourse. Thus, there are
indeed scenarios in which DROs may not be mean-
ingful. To resolve the at-risk question, one has to
run the numbers assuming a failed business and
determine whether creditors can enforce the DRO,
and, if so, how payment on the DRO would be
used. Without that effort, it is impossible to calcu-
late the at-risk amount. Alas, the Tax Court in
Hubert did not make that effort.43
The fundamental problem with Hubert is that the
Tax Court made what amounted to a categorical
decision that a DRO per se cannot lead to an
amount at risk. That conclusion conflicts with sec-
tion 465 and associated case law, which focus on
bottom-line economic exposure. There is no doubt
that there are many fact patterns in which a DRO
can create near-term, legitimate economic exposure
on recourse debt and other fact patterns in which
this is not the case. The issue is not whether there is
a DRO but whether under all the facts and circum-
stances there is, in the Sixth Circuit, a worst-case
possibility of economic risk and, outside the Sixth
Circuit, a realistic possibility of economic risk. The
focus should be on all the facts and circumstances,
not on DROs.
C. Timing
Does a capital account actually have to be nega-
tive for a DRO to give rise to an at-risk amount? In
Hubert I, the Tax Court mentioned in passing that
the partners’ capital accounts were not negative.44
The court did not discuss the matter further, and
under the facts of the case, it does not appear that
this could literally have been true. LCL incurred
losses significantly in excess of the members’ capital
account balances in the relevant tax years.45 Under
section 465(a), the at-risk determination is made
annually.46 In other words, the taxpayer must be at
risk in the current tax year before section 465 will
permit a deduction. Accordingly, if the sole basis for
being at risk is a DRO, a partner is at risk in a given
tax year only to the extent that her capital account is
actually negative.
It is quite possible for a capital account to exceed
a partner’s outside basis before taking into account
partnership debt. Consider, for example, an LLC
taxed as a partnership to which the member’s sole
contribution is property with a tax basis of $1,000
and a fair market value of $10,000. The member’s
outside basis is $1,000,47 but his capital account is
$10,000.48 Under section 704(d), the tax losses that
he is allowed to deduct are limited to $1,000. His
at-risk amount is also $1,000.49 If, however, the
member is allocated $5,000 of recourse debt under
section 752, that debt increases his outside basis to
$6,000.50 Now the member is allowed to deduct
$6,000 of losses under section 704(d), which in turn
reduces his capital account to $4,000. However,
section 465 disallows the loss deduction unless the
member is at risk on his share of the debt. If the sole
basis for making the member at risk is a DRO, the
member could not be at risk in this example because
the capital account is not negative. Even after he
fully ‘‘uses up’’ his outside basis, he would still
have a positive capital account and no real way of
going negative. If, however, the recourse debt allo-
cated to the member is $20,000, his outside basis
increases to $21,000, with the capital account re-
maining at $10,000. If he is allocated losses of
$21,000, his capital account becomes a negative
$11,000. Under those facts, a DRO of at least $11,000
42See Burke 2008, supra note 3, for an excellent discussion of
these issues.
43See Kalinka, supra note 3, and Burke 2008, supra note 3, in
which the authors offer some possible calculations.
44Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 84.
45See Kalinka, supra note 3, in which Kalinka suggests that
the court might have meant basis rather than true capital
accounts, and she also calculates possible negative capital
account balances.
46In contrast, section 752 includes liabilities in basis regard-
less of whether they are needed to permit a loss deduction.
47Section 722.
48See infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
49Section 465(b)(1).
50See sections 752(a) and 722.
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should (Hubert notwithstanding) increase the tax-
payer’s at-risk amount by $11,000 (to a total of
$12,000 counting the basis of the contributed prop-
erty). Thus, $12,000 of losses allocated to the mem-
ber are potentially deductible under the at-risk
rules.51 But because the at-risk determination must
be made annually, the member would have to have
a negative capital account for the at-risk rules to be
relevant. The member will be unable to deduct the
first $9,000 of losses if he does not have some
independent basis for being at risk, because those
losses would not cause his capital account to go
negative.
D. Indefensible Decision?
So were the Hubert courts’ decisions wholly
indefensible? Perhaps not quite, although the courts
seemed mostly unaware of their best arguments. In
Hubert II, the Tax Court noted that the LLC agree-
ment contained the following additional (often-
seen) language:
Nothing express or implied in this Agreement
is intended or shall be construed to confer
upon or to give any person or entity, other
than the parties or their successors-in-interest
in accordance with the provision of this Agree-
ment, any rights or remedies hereunder or by
reason hereof.
This language should prevent creditors from
being third-party beneficiaries of any DRO. In yet
another example of sloppy opinion writing, the
Hubert II court introduced the language with the
statement that the ‘‘agreement contains a provision
concerning potential third-party beneficiaries.’’ But
the court did not further address the third-party
beneficiary issue with any specificity. It did restate
the quoted language, almost in passing, in its
conclusion, but the court primarily based its hold-
ing on the other issues I discussed earlier. However,
the third-party beneficiary issue is highly impor-
tant, and I dedicate a later section of this report to it.
As I will explain, had the court grounded its
decision in the fact that the creditors were not
third-party beneficiaries of the DROs, it would have
had a stronger basis for its holding, although per-
haps still not a completely persuasive one. But
without that focus, the third-party beneficiary lan-
guage in the Hubert II decision contributes little, if
anything, to the court’s reasoning.
E. Hubert v. Section 752 Regulations52
Section 752(a) provides that an increase in a
partner’s share of partnership liabilities is treated as
a contribution of money by the partner to the
partnership and thus increases the partner’s basis in
the partnership interest under section 722. This
ability of entity-level debt to increase partner-level
basis is unique to partnerships and often makes
them the preferred vehicle. Because a partner may
not deduct partnership losses exceeding her basis in
the partnership interest under section 704(d), in a
sense, more partnership debt means more possible
loss deductions for partners.
The rules for allocating recourse and nonrecourse
debt to partners are different. Here I will focus on
the rules for recourse debt, since nonrecourse debt
under the facts of Hubert could not have given rise
to an at-risk amount. Generally, a partner is allo-
cated recourse debt based on that partner’s eco-
nomic risk of loss on the debt.
Reg. section 1.752-2(b)(1) allocates recourse debt
based on a constructive liquidation of the partner-
ship in which the partnership assets are sold for no
consideration other than the release of nonrecourse
debt. A partner or related person bears the eco-
nomic risk of loss on a recourse liability if after the
constructive liquidation (1) the partner or related
person would be obligated to make a payment to
any person because the liability became due and
payable, and (2) the partner or related person
would not be entitled to reimbursement from an-
other partner or a related person to another partner.
All the facts and circumstances are considered in
determining the extent to which a partner has an
obligation to make a payment on a recourse liabil-
ity.53 The regulations specifically list a DRO as a
relevant fact.54 In determining whether a person has
a payment obligation, it is assumed that all partners
and related persons who have obligations to make
payment actually perform those obligations, re-
gardless of their net worth, unless there is a plan to
‘‘circumvent or avoid the obligation.’’55
The economic risk of loss rules and the at-risk
rules are not mirror images of each another, and
they sometimes apply differently.56 But in this con-
text, the economic risk of loss rules address the
same issue as the at-risk rules: bottom-line eco-
nomic exposure on recourse debt, taking all the
facts and circumstances into account. It is clear that
a DRO can generate economic risk of loss under the
51Sections 704(d) and 465 operate in parallel. See Lipton et al.,
supra note 32, at para. 4.07.
52In this discussion, I borrow liberally from Lipton et al.,
supra note 32, at ch. 3.
53Reg. section 1.752-2(b)(3).
54Reg. section 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii).
55Reg. section 1.752-2(b)(6).
56See Kalinka, supra note 3.
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section 752 regulations, and there is no apparent
reason why it categorically should not also be able
to generate an amount at risk under the at-risk
rules. Indeed, the IRS has previously acknowledged
that a DRO can increase both economic risk of loss
and the at-risk amount.57 The IRS would have been
wise to stay with its original thinking.58
Because all facts and circumstances are consid-
ered under the economic risk of loss rules, an
unduly remote possibility of actually having to
fulfill a DRO might not provide an economic risk of
loss. And if a DRO cannot provide for economic risk
of loss, it is difficult to argue that it should provide
an at-risk amount. To what extent should time alone
make a DRO unduly remote? There is certainly a
cogent argument that if the DRO most likely will
not have to be met until the distant future, the
obligation is unduly remote. However, it is difficult
to create a coherent rule for time, given the current
rules for including debt in basis inside and outside
the partnership context. As long as a bona fide
debtor-creditor relationship exists, there are no limi-
tations on how long the debt repayment obligation
may run. Indeed, everyday homeowners typically
carry a 30-year mortgage, with little paid on prin-
cipal for much of the loan term. It is hard to make
the case that a DRO that might not need to be
fulfilled for a similar length of time should be given
a lesser status. Thus, although the time concern is a
fair one, addressing it coherently would require an
overarching change in the way we treat debt gen-
erally.59
III. Creditor: Third-Party Beneficiary of a DRO?
A. Generally
I will focus on the widely accepted Restatement
(Second) of Contracts for (curiously non-sequential)
guidance.60 Section 304 of the Restatement pro-
vides:
A promise in a contract creates a duty in the
promisor to any intended beneficiary to per-
form the promise, and the intended benefi-
ciary may enforce the duty.
Section 302 of the Restatement provides:
1. Unless otherwise agreed between promisor
and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an
intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate
to effectuate the intention of the parties and
either
a. the performance of the promise will
satisfy an obligation of the promisee to
pay money to the beneficiary; or
b. the circumstances indicate that the
promisee intends to give the beneficiary
the benefit of the promised performance.
2. An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary
who is not an intended beneficiary.
Importantly, section 308 of the Restatement pro-
vides:
It is not essential to the creation of a right in an
intended beneficiary that he be identified
when a contract containing the promise is
made.
Section 310 of the Restatement provides:
1. Where an intended beneficiary has an en-
forceable claim against the promisee, he can
obtain a judgment or judgments against either
the promisee or the promisor or both based on
their respective duties to him. Satisfaction in
whole or in part of either of these duties, or of
a judgment thereon, satisfies to that extent the
other duty or judgment, subject to the prom-
isee’s right of subrogation.
57See FSA 0293 (Dec. 15, 2003) (concluding that DROs in-
creased limited partners’ bases in their partnership interests
under section 752(a) and their at-risk amounts under section
465); see also Rubin, Whiteway, and Finkelstein, ‘‘Tax Court
Sticks,’’ supra note 9.
58Although on appeal the IRS took a more nuanced approach
than the Tax Court ultimately did. See Burke 2003, supra note 3.
59The section 752 regulations address this issue modestly. If
a partner has an economic risk of loss on a debt because of a
contribution obligation, that contribution must be made within
90 days of the liquidation of the partnership interest to be taken
into account at full value. Otherwise, it is taken into account at
present value, unless the partner is required to pay interest at no
less than the applicable federal rate from the date of liquidation.
Reg. section 1.752-2(g). The at-risk rules do not contain a similar
provision. See Follender v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 943 (1987); and
Pritchett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-21.
60See Gregory Maggs, ‘‘The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law,’’ 66 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 508 (1998); Kellye Y. Testy, ‘‘Whose Deal Is It?:
Teaching About Structural Inequality by Teaching Contracts
Transactionally,’’ 34 U. Tol. L. Rev. 699 (2003); and Stephen J.
Leacock, ‘‘Fingerprints of Equitable Estoppel and Promissory
Estoppel on the Statute of Frauds in Contract Law,’’ 2 Wm. &
Mary Bus. L. Rev. 73 (2011).
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2. To the extent that the claim of an intended
beneficiary is satisfied from assets of the prom-
isee, the promisee has a right of reimburse-
ment from the promisor, which may be
enforced directly and also, if the beneficiary’s
claim is fully satisfied, by subrogation to the
claim of the beneficiary against the promisor,
and to any judgment thereon and to any
security therefor.
Section 311 of the Restatement provides:
1. Discharge or modification of a duty to an
intended beneficiary by conduct of the prom-
isee or by a subsequent agreement between
promisor and promisee is ineffective if a term
of the promise creating the duty so provides.
2. In the absence of such a term, the promisor
and promisee retain power to discharge or
modify the duty by subsequent agreement.
3. Such a power terminates when the benefi-
ciary, before he receives notification of the
discharge or modification, materially changes
his position in justifiable reliance on the prom-
ise or brings suit on it or manifests assent to it
at the request of the promisor or promisee.
4. If the promisee receives consideration for an
attempted discharge or modification of the
promisor’s duty which is ineffective against
the beneficiary, the beneficiary can assert a
right to the consideration so received. The
promisor’s duty is discharged to the extent of
the amount received by the beneficiary.
For purposes of this discussion, I am assuming
the partnership or LLC operating agreement has a
standard DRO, such as the one in Hubert, in which
the proceeds of the DRO can be used to pay
creditors. If, for example, partners were obligated to
restore a deficit capital account to enable the part-
nership to pay the positive capital account balances
of other partners but not to pay creditors, the
creditors could not be third-party beneficiaries of
the DRO.
Normally, partners do not have DROs to the
extent the deficit capital account is created by
nonrecourse debt.61 But even if a partner did have a
DRO in this scenario as a result of bad lawyering, a
creditor should be unable to be a third-party ben-
eficiary of the DRO because that ability would have
the unintended effect of making a nonrecourse debt
recourse. Thus, the rest of this discussion focuses on
deficit capital accounts generated by recourse debt.
Assume the following scenario: An LLC taxed as
a partnership borrows $100,000 on a recourse basis.
The LLC has two equal members, A and B, who do
not guarantee the debt but who each contribute
$25,000 to the LLC. The LLC complies with the
substantial economic effect rules, and A and B have
DROs sufficient to enable them under the section
752 regulations to each be allocated $50,000 of the
recourse debt.62 The LLC buys depreciable equip-
ment for $150,000, paying for it with the debt
proceeds and the cash A and B contributed. Assume
the LLC breaks even except for depreciation deduc-
tions in all relevant years. A and B each start with a
positive capital account of $25,000. By the time the
equipment is fully depreciated, A and B will each
have a negative capital account of $50,000 and, of
course, a DRO of $50,000. Following the language of
the Restatement, regarding the DROs, A and B are
the promisors and the LLC is the promisee. Obvi-
ously, under these facts, the only way the LLC will
be able to pay the recourse creditor is if A and B
fulfill their contractual obligations and pay the LLC
the negative balances in their capital accounts.
Under Restatement sections 304 and 302, it seems
inescapable that the creditor is the intended benefi-
ciary of A’s and B’s DROs (that is, the creditor is a
third-party beneficiary of A and B’s promise to the
LLC). The LLC has no other way to pay the debt
(meeting the requirements of Restatement section
302(1)(a)). Further, under Restatement section 310,
the creditor may sue A and B directly. Note that
section 752 permits the recourse debt to be allocated
to A and B under these circumstances precisely
because they are effectively liable on the debt.63
Of course, the facts are usually not that simple.
There may be many properties, many ways losses
are generated, sales and purchases of properties,
and creditors who come and go. But under Restate-
ment section 308, the creditor need not be known
when the DRO is established. As long as an alloca-
tion of recourse debt to a partner is what enables the
partner to have a negative capital account balance,
the creditors should be the third-party beneficiaries
of the DRO because the partnership ultimately
depends on the DRO to be able to satisfy the
creditor, at least when the business fails.
I could find no cases that address the third-party
beneficiary issue in the DRO context. Although
there are undoubtedly countless partnership agree-
ments with some kind of DRO, there may not yet
have been a critical mass of unpaid creditors of
insolvent partnerships with solvent partners who
refused to meet their DROs. That said, courts have
found creditors to be third-party beneficiaries of
61See infra notes 133-149 and accompanying text.
62See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
63Id.
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limited partners’ promises to make additional capi-
tal contributions to the limited partnership.64 Be-
cause there is no real, substantive difference
between a DRO and a fixed obligation to make a
capital contribution, those cases are highly persua-
sive in the DRO area for courts that do not want to
rely on the Restatement alone.
B. Eliminating Third-Party Beneficiary Status
Can the partners prevent a creditor from being a
third-party beneficiary? Yes. Restatement section
302 provides for third-party beneficiary treatment
‘‘unless otherwise agreed.’’65 Indeed, the agreement
in Hubert had language effectively denying credi-
tors third-party beneficiary status, although the
court did not meaningfully address the third-party
beneficiary issue.66 I am aware of no data on this,
but my sense is that anti-third-party-beneficiary
language like that in Hubert is fairly common.
However, one may question whether it is wise for
partners to prevent a creditor from being a third-
party beneficiary. If creditors are unpaid, in the
typical case there would be no incentive for the
partners to cause the partnership to liquidate to
trigger the DROs because any funds paid would go
to the creditors.67 Under debtor-creditor law, the
partnership would have to use the contributed
funds first to pay the creditors, and it could not
distribute them to other partners.68 That would in
turn suggest that partners with deficit capital ac-
counts would not have ultimate liability to the
creditor despite their DROs. This fact should elimi-
nate the partners’ economic risk of loss for section
752 purposes and (for courts not convinced by
Hubert) the at-risk amount under section 465. Less
economic risk of loss means less outside basis, and
a lower at-risk amount means, well, a lower amount
at risk, which together equate to reduced loss
deductions. But the partners most likely would not
have agreed to DROs to begin with if they did not
want to be able to deduct allocable losses. Thus,
preventing creditors from being third-party benefi-
ciaries of DROs may be too clever by half. Had the
court in Hubert focused on this issue, it might have
reached a more defensible holding.
What keeps this line of reasoning from being
completely convincing is bankruptcy law. Recall
that both the economic risk of loss rules and the
at-risk rules look at bottom-line risk when things go
sour. Typically, the partnership will be insolvent, its
creditors can readily force it into a chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy, and the partnership can be liquidated by the
bankruptcy trustee.69 That in turn will trigger the
partners’ DROs. So perhaps negating third-party
beneficiary status does not prevent a partner from
having economic risk of loss or (despite Hubert) an
at-risk amount after all. But denying creditors third-
party beneficiary status makes it at least somewhat
less likely that the DRO will be enforced. Not all
failed businesses are forced into bankruptcy. In an
uncomplicated partnership with simple allocation
regimes, the bankruptcy card is likely still sufficient
to give the partners with DROs economic risk of
loss and an at-risk amount. But in complex deals
with varying allocations and many tiered partner-
ships, denying third-party beneficiary status to
creditors may be the fact that tips the balance and
makes the possibility of having to fulfill a DRO too
remote to justify an allocation of economic risk of
loss for section 752 purposes. Recall that the section
752 regulations look at all the facts and circum-
stances.70 By the same token, in circuits that follow
the realistic possibility test, the partners may be
denied an amount at risk (although the lack of a
debt allocation under section 752 probably moots
the at-risk rules). Complexity also creates proof
problems, as I discuss below.
C. Recourse-Generated Losses
Assuming the creditor is not denied third-party
beneficiary status, it should be able to be a third-
party beneficiary only of a negative capital account
attributable to recourse-debt-generated losses. If the
capital account is negative for some other reason,
there would be no intent to benefit the creditor. For
example, in the above example, assume C contrib-
utes $20,000 to become a partner and the partner-
ship makes a distribution of $10,000 each to A and
B. A’s and B’s negative capital accounts increase
from a negative $50,000 to a negative $60,000. But
under the Restatement, the creditor could be seen as
a third-party beneficiary only of the first $50,000.
The additional $10,000 deficit creates contractual
rights and obligations among the partners and the
64See International Investors v. Business Park Fund, 991 P.2d 219
(Alaska 1999). See also Racing Investment Fund 2000 LLC v. Clay
Ward Agency Inc., 320 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2010); Continental Waste
Systems Inc. v. Zoso Partners, 727 F. Supp. 1143, 1149-1150 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); and Builders Steel Co. v. Hycore Inc., 877 P.2d 1168 (Okla.
App. 1994).
65See Murray on Contracts, section 131[B][2].
66See discussion under Section II.D.
67I am assuming the partnership is an LLP or an LLC where
there is no direct owner liability to the creditors.
68See supra note 30. Of course, if the DROs exceeded the debt
owed to creditors, partners with positive capital account bal-
ances would have an incentive to liquidate.
69See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
70See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
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partnership, but nothing in the Restatement sug-
gests there is a way the creditor could be seen as an
intended beneficiary.
The difficulty for creditors may not be in arguing
that the third-party beneficiary doctrine can apply
but rather proving that a negative capital account is
attributable to recourse-debt-based loss allocations.
The examples I gave above are very simple. And
indeed, life is not always complex; there are part-
nerships in operation not so different from my
examples. But as the complexity increases, proving
cause and effect becomes a major challenge. There
may be many classes of partners, each with differ-
ent allocation regimes and different distribution
rights. The partnerships may be tiered. The partner-
ships may own many different businesses with
many different assets, with both nonrecourse and
recourse debt, and with some debt having both
nonrecourse and recourse elements. Tracking what
caused a capital account to go negative may be no
easy feat. Perhaps the proof challenges explain why
there are no cases dealing with DROs and third-
party beneficiary rights.
D. Deleting DROs?
Can the partnership and its partners agree to
change the DRO, perhaps eliminating it? The an-
swer will often be no. If the creditor lent money to
the partnership in reliance on the DRO, Restate-
ment section 311(3) should prohibit a change to the
terms of the DRO, although in many fact patterns
the creditor might find it difficult to prove reliance.
But of course, the creditor has no enforcement
rights if the DRO prohibited it from having third-
party beneficiary status.71
Because the DROs in Hubert indeed prevented
creditors from being third-party beneficiaries, the
members could have amended the operating agree-
ment to eliminate the DROs. As Professor Susan
Kalinka has noted, this ability in turn could prevent
the members from being at risk on the DRO (as-
suming it survives the other attacks under the
at-risk rules discussed above).72 There is no case on
point in the DRO area, but there is a relevant limited
partnership case. In Callahan,73 each limited partner
had the right to opt out of an obligation to make an
additional capital contribution if doing so would
not harm creditors. The Tax Court concluded that
the opt-out clause prevented the limited partners
from being at risk. Although there was no opt-out
clause in Hubert, the two members of LCL were
controlled by the same entity, making an amend-
ment to the operating agreement virtually hurdle
free. Under the facts of Hubert, this effective opt-out
ability might, at least at first blush, have provided a
reasonable basis for the Tax Court to conclude that
the taxpayers were not at risk on their DROs.74 But
there are problems with that argument.
As a preliminary matter, the argument holds only
under facts in which, as in Hubert, the amendment
is easily achieved. It does not hold if the partners
have little or no practical ability to agree to remove
DROs. That is likely the more typical scenario. For
example, if the partners are unrelated, have conflict-
ing interests, and are relatively numerous, they will
likely be unable to agree to remove a DRO. Or if one
solvent partner has independently guaranteed part-
nership debt, he will almost never agree to let other,
unrelated partners off the hook on their DROs.
Further, there is an important difference between
a DRO and the obligation in Callahan: The latter was
effectively never fixed until the capital call was
made, whereas a DRO represents an already fixed
obligation. There are many reasons a limited part-
ner in a similar situation to Callahan might opt out.
She might have personal financial difficulties; the
partnership might be in financial trouble; or she just
might prefer a different investment. But because
removing a DRO would likely involve adverse tax
consequences, it will typically occur when the part-
nership is in financial trouble. And then bankruptcy
law again presents hurdles.
The adverse tax consequences are the following:
As I will discuss below, removing a DRO might
create COD income. Also, if a partner is allocated
recourse debt based on the DRO,75 reducing the
DRO also reduces the recourse debt that had previ-
ously been allocated to the partner. That reduction
constitutes a deemed distribution of money to the
partner under section 752(b), causing the partner to
71Of course, other partners may be less than enthusiastic
about a DRO being reduced, assuming that would put more of
the onus for paying the debt on them.
72See Kalinka, supra note 3; see also 9A Kalinka, Jeffrey W.
Koonce, and Philip T. Hackney, Louisiana Limited Liability Com-
panies and Partnerships: A Guide to Business and Tax Planning,
section 6:7 (2015). This ability to remove the DRO could
conceivably prevent the DRO from generating an economic risk
of loss. Reg. section 1.752-2(b)(4) provides that a payment
obligation is disregarded if, taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, the obligation is subject to contingencies that
make it unlikely that it will ever be discharged. See Kalinka,
supra note 3.
73Callahan v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 276 (1992).
74Note that if the argument holds, this ability likely would
also prevent the members from having economic risk of loss on
the DROs under section 752. As discussed above, although a
DRO can be a basis for creating an economic risk of loss, the
regulations consider all the facts and circumstances. The ability
to amend away a DRO is, of course, a highly relevant fact. See
supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text; and reg. section
1.752-2(b)(4).
75See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
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recognize gain under section 731 if the deemed
distribution exceeds the partner’s basis in his part-
nership interest. If, Hubert notwithstanding, a DRO
increases the at-risk amount, section 465(e) may join
the party. If as a result of removing the DRO, the
partner’s at-risk amount drops below zero, section
465(e) requires the partner to include the negative
amount in income.
The bankruptcy law hurdles are the following:
Once a bankruptcy petition has been filed, the
automatic stay in Bankruptcy Code section 362(a)
prevents any act to try to alter the relative rights of
creditors against the debtor. Thus, after a bank-
ruptcy filing, it would be impossible to remove a
DRO. Further, section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code
permits the bankruptcy trustee to avoid a transfer
that causes creditors to receive more than they
would otherwise receive. The transfer must occur
within 90 days before bankruptcy generally and for
one year prior for insiders. Section 101(31) of the
Bankruptcy Code defines insiders to include gen-
eral partners. Although section 101(31) does not
contemplate LLCs and their members, that does not
seem to present the hurdle it does in the tax code.
The definitions of insider in section 101(31) have
been held to be ‘‘illustrative rather than exhaus-
tive,’’76 and a bankruptcy court and the Seventh
Circuit have concluded that an LLC member with
management responsibility is an insider.77 Section
101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code defines transfer
very broadly and covers almost any act that dimin-
ishes the value of the debtor vis-à-vis unsecured
creditors. Thus, removing a DRO could be seen as a
transfer. Because removing a DRO would re-trigger
debt obligations, possibly causing some creditors to
receive more than they would otherwise receive, it
could well trigger section 547. Further, often the
one-year period would apply, making section 547
difficult to plan around, particularly when one
considers that a debtor can be forced into bank-
ruptcy. And, of course, well-informed creditors will
have an incentive to force a debtor into bankruptcy
if they know the clock is ticking on a deleted DRO.78
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code might pose
an even larger hurdle. It permits the bankruptcy
trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers. Section 548
applies to transfers made within two years of
bankruptcy ‘‘with the intent to hinder, delay or
defraud’’ creditors. Of course, the whole point of
removing a DRO would be to alter the obligation to
creditors, likely triggering section 548. And the
two-year time frame would be difficult to plan
around.
Thus, bankruptcy law would commonly prevent
the partners from removing the DROs. In the Sixth
Circuit, which applies the at-risk rules using a
worst-case supposition, it is hard to see how one
gets around these bankruptcy provisions. Bank-
ruptcy is the quintessential worst case. Further, the
conclusion could be the same in jurisdictions that
require the taxpayer to have a realistic possibility of
being at risk. Going bankrupt is hardly beyond the
realm of the realistically possible, particularly for a
partnership in financial trouble. And again, it is
when the partnership is in financial trouble that
partners would be inclined to remove a DRO.
Although I think Kalinka’s argument has merit in
facts such as those involved in Hubert, it would be
difficult to convert it into a bright-line rule that has
much consistent cogency. First of all, scenarios in
which the partners can be expected to agree easily
to remove DROs, as in Hubert, are probably the
exception. And even then, bankruptcy law com-
monly prevents the partners from removing the
DROs. I have never been a fan of creating a rule to
deal with a rare event. But if there is going to be a
rule, it should be the same as the one for determin-
ing economic risk of loss in the section 752 regula-
tions.79 In each case, all the facts and circumstances
must be considered. A partner’s real, practical abil-
ity to delete a DRO is surely a relevant fact, but not
itself determinative.
IV. Transfers When Negative
When a partner sells or gifts a partnership inter-
est, the transferee inherits the transferor’s capital
account.80 This raises several questions.
Example: A partner contributes $20,000 to the
partnership and is allocated $30,000 of partnership
recourse debt under section 752. Her outside basis
is $50,000, but her capital account is $20,000. Under
section 704(d), she may be allocated losses up to her
basis, that is, $50,000.81 Assuming for now that she
has an unlimited DRO, a $50,000 loss allocation
gives her a $30,000 deficit in her capital account and
a zero tax basis. Now assume the partner sells the
partnership interest for $10,000 plus the assumption
76In re Krehl, 86 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 1996).
77Longview Aluminum LLC v. Brandt, 431 B.R. 193 (N.D. Ill.
2010), aff’d, 657 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Kapila v. Clark,
431 B.R. 263 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010); United States v. Forbes, 740 F.
Supp.2d 326 (D. Conn. 2010); and Sergeant v. G.R.D. Investments
LLC, 331 B.R. 401 (2005).
78In Kalinka, supra note 3, at n.86, the author, while acknowl-
edging that a bankruptcy trustee could enforce a DRO, observes
that the members may retract the DROs before filing for
bankruptcy. As the text notes, this may not be feasible.
79Reg. section 1.752-2(b)(4).
80Reg. section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(l).
81Subject to the at-risk rules of section 465 and the passive
loss rules of section 469.
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of her share of partnership liabilities, which remain
unchanged (Scenario 1). Section 752(d) requires the
liabilities to be included in the amount realized,
making the total gain recognized under section 1001
equal to $40,000 - $0 = $40,000.82 The buyer’s
outside basis is $40,000, but the capital account
stays at a negative $30,000. Because the buyer is
willing to pay the seller $10,000 in cash and assume
the debt, there should be equity in the partnership
assets, of which the buyer’s share is $10,000 (ignor-
ing possible discounts for lack of marketability and
lack of control). Given the $30,000 of debt, the
buyer’s share of the gain in partnership assets is
$40,000. As the partnership sells its assets, it recog-
nizes book and tax gain (which I am assuming are
the same).83 If the values do not change, and
ignoring post-purchase partnership income or loss,
the buyer eventually has a $10,000 capital account,
that is, a capital account equal to what he paid for
the partnership interest. Under these facts, there is
no particular reason why the existence of the nega-
tive capital account at the time of the sale should
trigger any special additional consequences for the
selling partner.
The answer should not change if the debt is
nonrecourse instead of recourse and if, instead of an
actual DRO, there is a deemed $30,000 DRO to the
extent of the partner’s share of minimum gain.84 As
in Scenario 1, what allows the selling partner to
have a negative capital account is the nonrecourse
debt, and on the sale, section 752(d) will set every-
thing right. Further, minimum gain itself should not
trigger a special consequence for the selling partner
any more than any other gain inherent in partner-
ship property because it is not fundamentally dif-
ferent.85
Returning now to the recourse debt version of
Scenario 1, what if, before the sale, the partnership
distributes to the selling partner property with a tax
basis and FMV of $10,000. Further assume that the
distribution falls within the tax-free distribution
rules of section 731.86 The selling partner’s capital
account is now negative $40,000 (-$30,000 - $10,000),
his outside basis remains zero, and he takes a zero
basis in the distributed property under section 732.
If the values in the example are otherwise the same,
the buyer would be willing to assume the seller’s
debt but pay no cash for the partnership interest
(Scenario 2). In other words, the extra negative
$10,000 capital account offsets the $10,000 in equity
that existed in Scenario 1. If everything else is held
constant, when the partnership disposes of its as-
sets, the buyer’s capital account gets back to zero
because the buyer paid no cash and assumed the
seller’s share of partnership debt. How should tax
law now treat the selling partner? Should the ‘‘ex-
tra’’ $10,000 of negative capital account be treated as
an additional liability of the selling partner that the
buyer assumes, generating $10,000 of additional
gain? This seems to be the correct answer because
the extra $10,000 of negative capital account means
an extra $10,000 of DRO, which is a real liability for
the seller that the buyer accepts. Indeed, it appears
to fall within section 752(d), which states:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest
in a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in
the same manner as liabilities in connection
with the sale or exchange of property not
associated with partnerships.
Nothing limits the application of section 752(d)
to a partner’s share of partnership liabilities; it
speaks to liabilities generally. The regulations, how-
ever, although not free from doubt, suggest only
partnership liabilities are meant.87 But even if sec-
tion 752(d) does not bring the extra $10,000 DRO
into the fold, the regulations under section 1001
would. They provide that liabilities assumed by a
buyer in any transaction are added to the amount
realized.88 Note that in Scenario 1 the selling part-
ner’s negative capital account and the share of
partnership liabilities match, so the negative capital
account did not trigger any additional tax conse-
quences. But in Scenario 2, the negative capital
82The sale can trigger a host of other provisions, including
sections 751(a), 754, 755, and 743(b). I will spare you the details.
83On a distribution of property to a partner, tax gain may not
be recognized under section 731, but book gain is still recog-
nized for capital account purposes. Reg. section 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1).
84See infra notes 131-147 and accompanying text.
85Implicit support for this position can be found in the
section 704(c) regulations. In its simplest version, section 704(c)
allocates gain or loss inherent in contributed property at the
time of the contribution to the contributing partner when the
partnership later sells the contributed property. The regulations
provide that if a partner transfers his partnership interest by sale
or gift, the transferee inherits the transferor’s section 704(c)
amount. Reg. section 1.704-3(a)(7). There is no conceptual
reason the answer should be any different for ‘‘untriggered’’
minimum gain of the transferring partner. Thanks to professor
James Maule of Villanova University School of Law for alerting
me to this issue.
86I am assuming no application of section 707(a)(2)(B),
704(c)(1)(B), or 737. Also, the regulations require that any book
gain or loss inherent in distributed property be recognized upon
the distribution, with appropriate adjustments to the partners’
capital accounts. In the example, there is no book gain or loss.
See reg. section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1).
87Reg. section 1.752-1(a)(4).
88Reg. section 1001-2(a).
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT
TAX NOTES, August 22, 2016 1119
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
(C) Tax Analysts 2016. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
account exceeds the selling partner’s share of part-
nership liabilities by $10,000, hence the need to
bring that $10,000 within either section 752(d) or
section 1001.89
What if the selling partner has only a $30,000
DRO but because of the distribution has a $40,000
negative capital account? Or alternatively, what if
the seller has no actual DRO, but the partnership
debt is nonrecourse instead of recourse, still allow-
ing the seller to have a $30,000 deficit capital
account before the property distribution,90 which
again increases the deficit capital account to $40,000
(Scenario 3)? In either case, the property distribu-
tion reduces the partner’s capital account below the
allowed deficit. If the partnership complies with the
regulations’ substantial economic effect test, in ei-
ther case the partnership is obligated to allocate
income to the partner to offset that extra $10,000
deficit (that is, make a qualified income offset).91
But what if the partnership has not yet earned the
income with which to make the qualified income
offset allocation at the time of the sale? The liability
rules are no longer any help because there is no
additional liability of the partnership or the selling
partner at issue. Note that while section 706(d)
provides rules for allocating income when partners’
interests in the partnership change, section 706(c)(2)
provides that the tax year for the partner who sells
his entire interest closes with the sale, meaning that
income earned by the partnership after the sale
cannot be allocated under section 706 to the selling
partner. Nonetheless, the selling partner has shifted
income he was ‘‘due’’ to the buyer as part of a sale.
It undermines the principles underlying the quali-
fied income offset rules to allow the selling partner
to avoid that income. The whole point of the
qualified income offset rules is to ‘‘fix’’ the fact that
a partner has a capital account that is more negative
than allowed — that the partner took more out of
the partnership than he was obligated to repay.
Under some circumstances, the sales price agreed to
by the buyer and seller may take into account the
extra taxes the seller would have to pay on the
income, but there is no assurance that will occur.
Further, that may change the character of the in-
come to the seller. And in a fundamental way, the
as-of-yet-unallocated income is personal to the
seller.92
Assignment of income principles provide the
answer. The partner has effectively sold an income
‘‘right’’ along with the partnership interest. There is
no case on point in the partnership context. In
non-partnership settings, courts have not achieved
consensus on how to treat the sale of a future right
to income.93 Commonly, a taxpayer wants to sell a
future right to income to increase income in the
current year (and reduce it in a future year). Increas-
ing income in the current year may enable the
taxpayer to take a tax deduction that might other-
wise be unavailable, such as an expiring net oper-
ating loss. The Sixth Circuit, the highest court to
address this issue, blessed the strategy in Estate of
Stranahan,94 concluding that selling a future right to
ordinary income generated ordinary income to the
seller in the year the consideration was received.
Other courts have rejected this treatment, finding
that the transaction lacked substance, and have
denied the increased deduction. Those courts typi-
cally treat the funds received in the current year as
a loan to be repaid in a future year.95
In Scenario 3, however, no manipulation of the
tax code is involved. One searches simply for the
proper tax treatment. The seller is terminating his
partnership interest, and the date of the sale is the
logical time to bring closure to all income recogni-
tion. In this setting, Estate of Stranahan provides a
logical way to proceed. Thus, whatever portion of
the sales price is attributable to that income right (in
Scenario 3, $10,000 without discounts) should be
income to the seller in the year of the sale.
What should the character of the income be? In
principle, it should be the same character as that of
89Although this analysis gives the correct result on the sale,
it does cause the selling partner to ultimately recognize ‘‘extra’’
tax gain. The tax gain on the sale is $40,000 - $0 = $40,000. The
partner takes a zero basis in the distributed property under
section 732(a)(2). If the values do not change, he will recognize
$10,000 of gain when he sells the property, for a total of $50,000
of gain. But this problem is less the consequence of applying
section 752 or 1001 than that of applying section 732(a)(2).
Whenever a partner takes a lesser basis in a distributed property
than what the partnership had, more gain will be recognized on
the sale of that property than would have been recognized if the
partnership had sold it. A section 754 election and section 734(b)
adjustment are designed to provide some relief in that case.
90See infra notes 133-149 and accompanying text.
91The extra $10,000 deficit triggers a qualified income offset
even if the debt is nonrecourse and the partner has a deemed
DRO. It does not trigger a minimum gain chargeback, which
arises only when a partner’s share of minimum gain drops. See
infra notes 133-149 and accompanying text.
92The income would not appear to fall within the definition
of an unrealized receivable that could trigger section 751(a).
93See Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir.
1973); and Principal Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl.
82 (2014), which criticized Estate of Stranahan. See also Hort v.
Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111
(1930); Hydrometals Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1972-254,
aff’d per curiam, 485 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1973); Mapco Inc. v. United
States, 556 F.2d 1107 (Ct. Cl. 1977); and Bittker, McMahon, and
Zelenak, supra note 10, at para. 34.02.
94472 F.2d 867.
95See Principal Life Insurance, 116 Fed. Cl. 82; Hydrometals, T.C.
Memo. 1972-254; Mapco, 556 F.2d 1107; and Bittker, McMahon,
and Zelenak, supra note 10, at para. 34.02.
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the income that would have been allocated to the
seller — typically, ordinary income. But in many
scenarios, it will not be knowable what the charac-
ter of income would have been. Perhaps the part-
nership earns both ordinary income and capital
gains in different amounts in different years. A
solution might be to take the relative percentages of
types of income that the partnership earned over
the preceding three years and apply them to the
income earned by the selling partner. Thus, if the
partnership over the preceding three years earned
90 percent ordinary income and 10 percent long-
term capital gains, the selling partner’s income
would be characterized the same way. In most
cases, the income should be all ordinary, limiting
the impact of the problem.96
What is the tax treatment to the buyer when the
$10,000 of qualified income offset is allocated to
her? Applying Estate of Stranahan principles shows
that the buyer paid for the income right. Thus, the
buyer should have income only to the extent that
what she paid for the income right is less than the
$10,000 of income allocated to her. This treatment
will require a special ‘‘off the books’’ adjustment for
the buyer, because subchapter K does not resolve
the question. This adjustment doubtless adds com-
plexity, but the complexity is preferable to allowing
the seller to avoid $10,000 of income that was
essentially personal to him.
What if instead of a qualified income offset, a
minimum gain chargeback has been triggered, for
example, because of payment of principal on a
nonrecourse loan?97 But what if the income to
implement that minimum gain chargeback has not
been earned at the time of the sale? This is concep-
tually the same situation as the qualified income
offset example, and the answer should be the same.
What if the transferor partner instead gifts the
partnership interest? Scenarios 1 and 2 should be
treated as a part-sale, part-gift transaction.98 The
effective liability assumption would be treated as
the amount realized for part-sale purposes. That
less the donor’s basis (in these facts, zero) would be
the donor’s gain. The difference between the FMV
of the partnership interest and the liability assumed
would be the part-gift portion of the transaction.99
In Scenario 3, however, the $10,000 ‘‘extra’’ negative
capital account does not represent a liability of the
donor but rather an income right of the donor that
is being gifted to the donee. When the $10,000
income is recognized by the partnership, it should
be allocated to the donee to offset the excess nega-
tive capital account. But the assignment of income
doctrine generally prevents taxpayers from gifting
income to another party.100
The assignment of income doctrine does not
normally tax gifted income at the time of the gift but
rather when it is recognized.101 It is true that if a
taxpayer gifts income-producing property, the in-
come earned after the gift belongs to the donee.102
But the donor is taxed on income that accrued
before the time of the gift, regardless of when
paid.103 Here an event has occurred before the gift,
triggering an income allocation to the donor. This
would seem to be a form of income accrual. Thus,
the relevant income, when allocated to the donee,
should be taxed to the donor. I suspect taxpayers do
not respect this analysis in real life.
V. DROs When Partnership Fails
What if the partnership business fails while part-
ners have negative capital accounts that they have
an obligation to restore? As discussed earlier, if it is
partnership debt that allowed the capital accounts
to go negative, resolving debt issues with the part-
nership’s creditors will likely restore the capital
accounts to zero. For the sake of completeness, I will
assume a partnership that has both nonrecourse
and recourse debt.
Creditors holding nonrecourse debt will typically
foreclose on the securing property or receive a deed
in lieu of foreclosure, triggering a minimum gain
chargeback and restoring a capital account deficit
attributable to nonrecourse deductions.104 If the
nonrecourse debt is exculpatory debt or is junior to
the recourse debt, matters get messier. In some
96The distributee partner ends up with ‘‘extra’’ gain of
$10,000 because he both is allocated (undiscounted) $10,000 of
income and takes a zero basis in the distributed property, which
has an FMV of $10,000. But this is a function of section 732(a)(2),
not an inappropriate consequence of the discussed analysis. A
section 754 election and a section 734(b) adjustment can provide
some relief.
97See infra notes 133-149 and accompanying text. Note that if
the minimum gain chargeback is triggered by a sale of the
underlying property, there is income to allocate to the selling
partner and the situation would not arise. Section 706 requires
partnership income earned up to the time of the sale to be
allocated to the selling partner.
98Reg. section 1.1015-4(a); see Bittker, McMahon, and Zel-
enak, supra note 10, at para. 29.03[4].
99See reg. section 1.1015-4(a); and Bittker, McMahon, and
Zelenak, supra note 10, at para. 29.03[4].
100See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111; and Bittker, McMahon, and Zelenak, supra note 10, at para.
34.02.
101Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111; see Bittker, McMahon, and
Zelenak, supra note 10, at para. 34.01.
102Bittker, McMahon, and Zelenak, supra note 10, at para.
34.03[1].
103Id. at para. 34.03[4].
104See infra notes 133-149 and accompanying text. As noted
above, an actual DRO would not typically exist if the only
partnership debt was nonrecourse debt.
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT
TAX NOTES, August 22, 2016 1121
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
(C) Tax Analysts 2016. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
cases, the creditors may be able to foreclose on
unsecured assets. In other cases, nonrecourse debt
may be forgiven, generating COD income. Either
process should generally offset deficit capital ac-
counts attributable to nonrecourse debt.
If the debt is recourse to the partners, again, the
creditors will typically foreclose on available assets,
although if the debt exceeds the FMV of the relevant
property, the amount realized will be limited to the
FMV.105 Normally, gain will be generated that can
offset at least some portion of the negative capital
account.106 The deficiency (that is, the difference
between the recourse debt and the FMV of the
partnership property) remains an obligation of the
partners liable on the debt. If the deficiency is
forgiven, there is possible COD income, which
would offset some portion of a negative capital
account. But if the debt is not forgiven and the
partners can pay the deficiency, they will likely
restore the remaining deficits in their capital ac-
counts and have the partnership pay the debt. Even
if the partners pay the debt directly to the creditor,
it should be seen as a deemed restoration of the
deficit capital account because the bottom-line eco-
nomic consequence is the same. For example, if the
partner’s negative capital account and DRO are
$10,000 but his share of gain from foreclosure is
only $8,000 because the recourse debt exceeds the
FMV of the property, there will be a negative $2,000
capital account remaining. The partner is liable for
this amount to the partnership upon liquidation of
the partnership. And the creditors can force liqui-
dation through involuntary bankruptcy.107 There
may be direct liability to the creditor if the creditor
is a third-party beneficiary of the DRO or if the
partner agreed to be directly liable on the debt.108
Either way the creditor gets paid, and the capital
account consequences should be the same regard-
less of the payment mechanics.
What if the deficit capital account is attributable
not to debt but to a distribution that partners
received? If the partnership has failed, what is likely
involved is a voidable transfer under debtor-
creditor law and the partners would be required to
repay the distribution to the partnership, again
resolving the deficit capital account.109 If debtor-
creditor law does not save the day and creditors are
unpaid, the creditors should still be able to force the
partnership into bankruptcy and then into liquida-
tion, triggering the DRO. If neither of those sce-
narios arises and the DRO is not enforced, it should
be seen as forgiven.
VI. Forgiveness of a DRO
What if the partnership and the other partners
simply forgive or decide not to enforce a DRO?110
Or what if the creditors don’t enforce their rights as
third-party beneficiaries or their rights to force the
partnership into bankruptcy? To mostly state the
obvious, section 108(d)(1) defines a debt as any
indebtedness for which the taxpayer is liable.111
COD income arises when a creditor either forgives
a debt or simply decides not to enforce its rights to
collect on the debt.112 A partner is liable for his
DRO, so it seems inescapable that a DRO is a debt.
Thus, if the DRO is forgiven or not enforced, it also
seems inescapable that the result should be COD
income.
I am unaware of any case fully on point, but the
issue was addressed in Bassing,113 which involved a
procedural issue. The taxpayer was one of two
general partners in a Maryland limited partnership
that developed real estate, and he also held a
limited partnership interest in that partnership. The
taxpayer, who was insolvent, had a deficit capital
account of $882,871 and a DRO. As part of a general
resolution of its indebtedness with its creditors, the
partnership forgave the taxpayer’s DRO, and he
waived specific rights he had under the partnership
agreement. The taxpayer initially reported the dis-
charge as a short-term capital gain of $882,871. He
then amended his return and applied for a refund.
The amended return treated the forgiveness of the
DRO as COD income, which, because the taxpayer
was insolvent, would have been excluded from
income under section 108(a)(1)(B) had the amended
105Reg. section 1.1001-2(a)(2).
106I am assuming — realistically — that capital accounts
were driven negative primarily through allocations of deduc-
tions, making it probable that the basis of the partnership assets
is fairly low and that there will be gain on foreclosure. If instead
a loss on foreclosure occurred, the capital accounts of the
partners would be more negative and the obligation of the
solvent partners that much greater.
107See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
108See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
109See supra note 30.
110As noted above, a deemed DRO should be eliminated
through the foreclosure process. See infra notes 133-149 and
accompanying text.
111See Zarin v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1084 (1989), rev’d, 916
F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
112See section 61(a)(12); and United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
284 U.S. 1 (1931). See Bittker, McMahon, and Zelenak, supra note
10, at para. 4.05[4]. If forgiveness of the debt is a gift, no COD
income should result. See id. at para. 4.05[4][c]. If a debt is
canceled as a payment for services, the taxpayer should have
income from services rather than COD income. See id. at para.
4.05[6]. If the partner is bankrupt, or to the extent the partner is
insolvent, COD income can be a good thing because section 108
will exclude it from the partner’s income.
113Bassing v. United States, 563 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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return been accepted. The taxpayer also would have
been entitled to a refund of the tax paid on the
amount reported as short-term capital gain. The
Federal Circuit, however, held that the taxpayer’s
refund action was barred by section 7422(h), which
generally prohibits refund actions attributable to
partnership items as defined in section 6231(a)(3).
The court concluded that forgiveness of the DRO:
was a partnership item because it represented
an amount determined by the partnership
under its capital account maintenance rules,
which constituted an accounting practice ad-
opted by the partnership and applicable to all
the partners. . . . The release of that obligation
was also a partnership item because it was
necessary to determine whether, under the
partnership’s capital account maintenance
rules, the capital account deficit would be
treated as an enforceable obligation, so that the
release of that obligation would qualify as a
cancellation of debt for the partnership. See
Treas. Reg. section 301.6231(a)(3)-1(a)(1).
The taxpayer in Bassing lost on procedure, but
there is nothing in the case to suggest he would
have lost on the merits. At no time did the court
object to COD treatment for the forgiven DRO, nor
would it have made much sense to do so. The
Federal Circuit did note in a footnote that ‘‘absent
an enforceable restoration obligation, it is likely that
a partner’s capital account deficit would not qualify
as a debt.’’ This is a bit of an odd comment because
a DRO is an enforceable restoration obligation. As
discussed above, it should qualify as debt.114 For-
giving a DRO could also cause a reallocation of
partnership debt to the partners under section
752.115
VII. Conclusion
Deficit capital accounts and DROs involve a host
of potential tax and nontax issues. The Hubert court
gave negative capital accounts a hard look but
found itself overmatched. Indeed, the sheer com-
plexity of the associated issues and the fact that
both tax and nontax law plays critical roles make
this area difficult to master. Some of the complexity
is the result of the advent of LLCs. Most relevant tax
law predates LLCs and does not contemplate
them.116 For example, tax law generally assumes
that some partner will be liable on partnership
recourse debt. But that need not be the case with
LLCs. Further, although DROs can exist with any
tax partnership, the fact that LLCs are so ubiquitous
brings matters into focus that previously tended to
reside more at the periphery of tax consciousness.
The at-risk rules provide a good example.
I hope to have convinced the reader that DROs
should permit taxpayers to be at risk on LLC
recourse debt in most circumstances. But under the
existing at-risk rules, that is a clunky process. The
DROs must be tied to LLC recourse debt, and
figuring out when an LLC has recourse debt is itself
not a simple matter. But in a conventional sense, a
member is at risk on her DRO. It represents a real
obligation. Why go through a convoluted process of
tying it to LLC recourse debt? One may ask whether
it would make more sense to just provide that a
DRO typically increases the at-risk amount to the
extent the capital account is negative and skip all
the fancy footwork. Other code sections can then
determine what deductions are allocated to a mem-
ber.
That said, although the at-risk rules present one
of the greater technical challenges, they are just one
part of the DRO puzzle. There are many other parts
that need to be addressed, often irrespective of the
advent of LLCs. I hope that this report has helped
piece them all together.
Appendix: A Primer117
A partnership is a flow-through entity. Income
and deductions are passed through to the partners.
A mechanism is needed for determining each part-
ner’s allocable share of partnership income and
deductions. Section 704(b) and its regulations gen-
erally allow partners a great deal of flexibility in this
regard. The allocations need not necessarily be in
proportion to the underlying ownership of the
partnership interests (as is the case with S corpora-
tions).118 Someone who is otherwise a 50 percent
partner could be allocated 90 percent of deprecia-
tion deductions, for example. Or all losses could
initially be allocated to the ‘‘money partners,’’ with
subsequent income allocated to them to the same
extent as losses were, and then income allocated 50
114In Buckley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-35, the court
held that a positive capital account balance did not constitute a
debt of the partnership and that the failure to pay it did not give
rise to a bad debt deduction by the erstwhile partner. In Curran
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-92, the court held that a deficit
capital account did not constitute a debt when there was no
specific obligation to restore it. These are obviously horses of a
different color. Similarly, see Turner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1960-210.
115See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
116Or limited liability limited partnerships.
117In writing this primer, I borrowed liberally from Lipton et
al., supra note 32, Chpt. 5. I am the primary author of this
chapter.
118See section 1377(a). Because partners can have varying
interests in capital and profits, determining what the underlying
ownership interest is may not be an easy task.
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percent to the money partners and 50 percent to the
promoters. This is sometimes called a ‘‘flip.’’ Flips
are quite common.
Section 704(b) provides that a partner’s ‘‘distribu-
tive share of income, gain, loss, and deduction, or
credit . . . shall be determined in accordance with
the partner’s interest in the partnership’’ if the
partnership agreement does not provide for how a
distributive share is allocated or if the allocations do
not have substantial economic effect. In subchapter
K, the word ‘‘distributive’’ has nothing to do with
distributions and is generally synonymous with
allocable. Thus, if an allocation does have substan-
tial economic effect, it need not be in accordance
with a partner’s interest in the partnership. A
partner’s interest in the partnership is determined
under a facts and circumstances test that is anything
but certain.119 The regulations provide detailed and
specific rules on when allocations have substantial
economic effect. Those substantial economic effect
rules provide a structure that is intended to be a
safe harbor. If the partnership agreement complies
with the rules, the partnership knows the transac-
tion will be safe. Many practitioners will endeavor
to comply with them if possible. It used to be that
practitioners viewed compliance with the substan-
tial economic effect rules as virtually mandatory,
but in recent years practitioners have been increas-
ingly drafting agreements to fall under the partners’
‘‘interest in the partnership’’ facts and circum-
stances test. Indeed, in large, complex deals, the
latter approach is likely the norm.
The partnership allocation rules have been called
‘‘a creation of prodigious complexity . . . essentially
impenetrable to all but those with the time, talent,
and determination to become thoroughly prepared
experts on the subject.’’120 Unfortunately, that is not
an exaggeration.
For an allocation to have substantial economic
effect under the safe harbor, the capital accounts
must be maintained in accordance with the rules in
the regulations. As the name of the substantial
economic effect test suggests, an allocation meets
the test if it has a genuine after-tax economic effect
on the partner to whom the allocation is made. The
rules for maintaining the capital accounts help
fulfill this task. Because the concern here is with the
economic effects rather than tax impacts, the rules
for maintaining capital accounts are quite different
from the rules for computing a partner’s basis in his
partnership interest (outside basis).
Under the regulations,121 a partner’s capital ac-
count is increased by:
1. the amount of money contributed to the
partnership;
2. the FMV of property contributed to the
partnership (net of liabilities secured by the
property that the partnership is considered to
assume or take subject to section 752);122 and
3. allocations of partnership income and gain,
including tax-exempt income.
A partner’s capital account is decreased by:
1. the amount of money distributed to the
partner;
2. the FMV of property distributed to the
partner (net of liabilities secured by the prop-
erty that the partner is considered to assume
or take subject to section 752);
3. allocations of expenditures of the partner-
ship that can be neither capitalized nor de-
ducted in computing taxable income; and
4. allocations of partnership loss and deduc-
tion.
The differences between the way a partner’s
outside basis is calculated and the way his capital
account is calculated are as follows: The outside
basis is increased for the basis of contributed prop-
erty, not its FMV as is the case with capital accounts.
Further, a partner’s capital account does not include
the partner’s share of partnership liabilities,
whereas under section 752, a partner’s outside basis
does. This disparity exists because, roughly at least,
a partner’s capital account is designed to measure a
partner’s net economic investment in the partner-
ship. But a partner’s outside basis is meant to reflect
his ‘‘tax investment’’ in the partnership, and for tax
purposes partnership liabilities can be included in a
partner’s outside basis under section 752.123 The
bottom line is that if the partnership has liabilities,
a partner’s outside basis often will exceed his
capital account balance.124 Because a partner may
119Reg. section 1.704-1(b)(3).
120Lawrence Lokken, ‘‘Partnership Allocations,’’ 41 Tax L.
Rev. 547 (1986).
121Reg. section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(a).
122The FMV assigned to property will be regarded as correct
if (1) that value is reasonably agreed to among the partners in
arm’s-length negotiations, and (2) the partners have sufficiently
adverse interests. See reg. section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(h).
123Section 752 mirrors the rule that when a taxpayer acquires
property with debt, recourse or nonrecourse, that debt is
included in the tax basis of the acquired property. See Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
124This is not inevitably the case, however. For example, if
the partner contributes property to a partnership with an FMV
that greatly exceeds its basis, the capital account may exceed the
tax basis of the partnership interest even after factoring in
liabilities.
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receive loss allocations up to his outside basis,125 a
partner may have a positive tax basis and a negative
capital account.
For example, assume a partner contributes
$20,000 to a partnership and his share of partner-
ship liabilities under section 752(a) is $10,000. The
partner’s capital account is $20,000, but the outside
basis is $30,000. Section 704(d) permits a partner to
deduct losses up to his basis in the partnership
interest.126 If a partner could not have a negative
capital account, it would be impossible to deduct
losses up to the partner’s total tax investment in the
partnership. To allow section 704(d) its full reign,
the regulations permit partners to have negative
capital accounts.
A brief digression: In the capital account context,
it is necessary to distinguish between tax gain and
book gain and between tax basis and book value.
They may be the same but need not be. They will be
different if a partner contributes property to a
partnership with a tax basis different from FMV.
The partnership’s tax basis in the partnership is
typically a carryover basis under section 723. But
the book value is the FMV. In this report, I assume
book value and tax basis are the same.
As mentioned above, the regulations’ substantial
economic effect rules are a safe harbor. An alloca-
tion that has substantial economic effect is allowed
under section 704(b). There are two parts to the test.
First, the allocation must have economic effect. The
regulations in most instances provide a mechanical
test for determining whether an allocation has
economic effect, which I outline below. Second,
because it is often possible to manipulate the eco-
nomic effect test, the regulations also provide that
the economic effect of an allocation must be sub-
stantial. Generally, the economic effect of an alloca-
tion is substantial if on an after-tax, present value
basis, a partner’s economic investment in the part-
nership is either enhanced or diminished as a
consequence of the allocation, though there are
several variations on that theme.127 Because my
focus is on negative capital accounts, which can
come into being under the economic effect test,
there is no need to delve further into the substanti-
ality test, important though its role is.
Partnerships have three options under the regu-
lations to meet the economic effect test: the regular
economic effect test, the alternate economic effect
test, and the economic effect equivalence test.128 I
will discuss only the first two of these options since
they are the ones most pertinent to negative capital
accounts.
The regular test has three parts:
1. The partnership must keep capital accounts
in accordance with the rules described above.
2. When an interest of a partner is liquidated,
the partner must be paid any positive balance
in his capital account.
3. If a partner has a deficit balance in his
capital account, he must pay the deficit to the
partnership by the end of the tax year in which
his partnership interest is liquidated (or, if
later, 90 days after liquidation). This last rule is
sometimes called a DRO.129
This regular economic effect test requires the
partner to have an unlimited DRO. An unlimited
DRO can mean unlimited liability. I give my part-
nership tax students the following example: An
employee of a limited partnership while on partner-
ship business runs over a neurosurgeon with eight
handicapped children. The personal liability judg-
ment far exceeds the partnership’s insurance limits
and generates a large loss. Under the limited part-
nership agreement, 99 percent of losses are allo-
cated to the limited partners. If the limited partners
have unlimited DROs, the losses can be allocated to
them, possibly generating large negative capital
accounts. If the partnership liquidates soon thereaf-
ter, the limited partners will end up paying for 99
percent of the personal injury judgment, which
almost certainly was not contemplated.
Recognizing this business reality, the regulations
contain an alternative in reg. section 1.704-
1(b)(2)(ii)(d). Under this alternative, partners may
have either no DRO or only a limited DRO. The
partnership agreement must meet the first two
economic effect tests (keep capital accounts accord-
ing to the rules, and upon liquidation, pay to a
partner any positive balance in his capital account).
The next requirement is that the partnership agree-
ment have a qualified income offset provision (dis-
cussed below). If this alternative test is met, for
partners with no DROs, an allocation will be treated
as having economic effect if the allocation does not
cause the partner to have a deficit capital account
balance (taking some adjustments into consider-
ation), or increase an existing deficit capital account
balance. For partners with limited DROs, the rules
are the same except that the allocation cannot cause
the capital account to be negative by more than the
limited DRO or increase a negative capital account
that already exceeds the limited DRO. If a partner125Section 704(d).
126Section 704(d) may be trumped by the at-risk rules of
section 465 and the passive loss rules of section 469.
127Reg. section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a).
128See Lipton et al., supra note 32, at section 5.03B. 129Reg. section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a)-(c).
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has a negative capital account balance, economi-
cally she has taken more out of the partnership than
she has put into it, thus the requirement under the
regular rules that she restore any deficit upon
liquidation of her interest. If the partner is not going
to have a DRO (or is going to have only a limited
DRO), it makes sense that a current allocation
would not be allowed to cause her to have a deficit
capital account (or one that exceeds a limited DRO).
Indeed, at one time that was almost all there was to
the rule. The difficulty with keeping the rule that
simple is that a capital account can become negative
(or excessively negative) for reasons other than
allocations. The partnership could, for example,
make a distribution to a partner that would cause a
negative capital account balance (or an excessive
negative capital account balance). Although the IRS
can force a partnership to change the way it makes
allocations, it cannot control who the partnership
makes distributions to.
The IRS needed a mechanism for eliminating the
deficit capital account of a partner who has no
obligation to restore it or the excessively negative
capital account for a partner with only a limited
DRO. That mechanism was to require the partner-
ship to allocate income to the partner to offset any
deficit the partner was not obligated to restore.
Further, distributions are not the only events the
IRS cannot control that can cause a capital account
to become negative. Some provisions of subchapter
K can require allocations to a partner that might
create an excessive deficit capital account, so the IRS
needed to account for those events as well. Finally,
it is obviously preferable to avoid the deficit capital
account to begin with. To this end, the partnership
is required to reduce the capital account for speci-
fied reasonably expected future events before deter-
mining whether the proposed allocation will create
a deficit capital account.130 These rules are of no
great import for this report and will not be detailed
here.
Thus, the relevant regulations131 provide that a
partner may have either no DRO or only a limited
one, if:
1. the first two requirements of the regular rule
are satisfied (that is, the requirement to keep
capital accounts in accordance with the regu-
lations and pay to a partner upon liquidation
of his interest any positive capital account
balance);
2. the allocation does not cause or increase a
deficit capital account balance beyond any
limited DRO; and
3. the partnership agreement contains a quali-
fied income offset provision.
A qualified income offset provision provides that
if, despite the above, a partner’s capital account
goes negative beyond any limited DRO (for ex-
ample, by a distribution), the partner will be allo-
cated items of income and gain (consisting of a pro
rata portion of each item of partnership income,
including gross income, and gain for that year) in
an amount and manner sufficient to eliminate the
excess deficit balance as quickly as possible.132
Assume a partner has a $10,000 capital account
and that there are no reasonably expected future
events. If the partner has no DRO but the partner-
ship agreement includes a qualified income offset
provision, the allocations to him will still be effec-
tive as long as they do not cause him to have a
negative capital account.133 In other words, the
maximum loss allocation to that partner is $10,000.
If, for example, because of a distribution, the part-
ner’s capital account does go negative, the partner-
ship is required to abandon its regular allocation
regime and first allocate income to the partner with
the negative capital account until the capital ac-
count is restored to zero.134
As indicated above, sometimes partners have
limited DROs. They will agree to restore a deficit in
their capital account up to a specified amount but
not beyond that. A partner might agree to a limited
DRO in order to be allocated more losses. In that
situation, the partnership will need to comply with
the qualified income offset rules, and allocations
can be made to a partner that create a negative
capital account up to the fixed amount that the
partner is obligated to restore. Thus, if a partner has
a $5,000 DRO, he could be given allocations that
caused him to have up to a $5,000 negative capital
account as long as the partnership otherwise com-
plies with the qualified income offset rules.
Because this report is about partners with nega-
tive capital accounts, typically the partners in ques-
tion will have to have some kind of DRO, at least if
the partnership has recourse debt. It is conceivable,
however, that some of the discussion will apply to a
partner with a negative capital account and no DRO
if the qualified income offset requirement has not
yet been able to fully restore the capital account to
zero because of insufficient income, for example.
Alas, there is yet another wrinkle for partner-
ships with nonrecourse debt. It is not uncommon
130See Lipton et al., supra note 32, at section 5.03B2.
131Reg. section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d).
132Id.
133The allocation could also not increase a negative capital
account she already had for some reason.
134If multiple partners are in this situation, the income is
allocated pro rata. Reg. section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d).
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for partnerships involved in the real estate industry
to use nonrecourse financing. The use of nonre-
course financing involves more than just tax plan-
ning. Avoiding personal liability is preferable for
obvious reasons. Lenders would, of course, prefer
recourse lending, but they commonly make nonre-
course loans to stay competitive in the lending
market. When enough equity is present, lenders
may actually prefer nonrecourse loans because typi-
cally the interest rate on nonrecourse debt is higher
than that on recourse debt.
However, the use of nonrecourse financing poses
a dilemma for partnership allocations. Recall that
the cornerstone of the substantial economic effect
rules is that allocations have a genuine economic
effect on the partners. This poses a problem for
deductions generated by nonrecourse debt, which
are called ‘‘nonrecourse deductions.’’135 When a
taxpayer, including a partnership, purchases prop-
erty with debt, recourse or nonrecourse, that debt is
included in the basis of the property.136 As noted
above, partnership liabilities are allocated to part-
ners under section 752 and can increase partners’
outside bases. Nonrecourse deductions arise when,
for example, depreciation deductions are generated
a partnership property’s basis attributable to non-
recourse debt (which would occur after any equity
in the property has been depreciated away).137 The
partners have an economic risk only to the extent of
any cash or property invested. To the extent that
basis and associated deductions are generated by
nonrecourse debt, only the lender is truly at risk. If
the venture fails, the partners can walk away with-
out any personal obligation on the debt. If the
deductions generated by the nonrecourse debt
cause the partners to have negative capital ac-
counts, a DRO may not be very meaningful. If all
the partners have negative capital accounts, which
commonly eventually occurs when nonrecourse
debt is used, none of them will have an incentive to
enforce DROs.138 For that reason, DROs don’t nor-
mally exist in the nonrecourse context unless the
lawyers are not paying attention. The regulations
therefore conclude that if property is purchased
with nonrecourse debt, only allocations of deduc-
tions attributable to the equity invested by the
partners can have economic effect.139 Allocations of
nonrecourse deductions cannot have economic ef-
fect.140
Example: Assume AB Partnership has two
equal partners, A and B. A and B invest no
funds in the partnership, and the partnership
borrows $200,000 on a nonrecourse basis and
uses the proceeds to buy an apartment build-
ing for $200,000. No principal payments on the
debt are due for five years. Capital accounts
are not increased for a partner’s share of loan
proceeds, so the partners’ beginning capital
accounts are zero. If the property drops in
value to $150,000, the partners could simply
default on the loan and would not be obligated
to make any payment to the lender. The lender
bears the risk of loss on the decline in the
property’s value. Now assume that AB Part-
nership takes $20,000 in depreciation deduc-
tions on the property. If we assume that the
partnership breaks even except for deprecia-
tion deductions, A and B have negative capital
accounts of $10,000 each and the partnership’s
basis is reduced to $180,000.141 A and B (as is
normally the case) do not have DROs. Thus,
neither A nor B has borne the economic bur-
den of the allocations, and those allocations
cannot have economic effect.
Because the allocation of nonrecourse deductions
cannot have economic effect, the general rule of the
regulations is that they must be allocated in accor-
dance with the partners’ interests in the partner-
ship.142 The use of nonrecourse debt is fairly
common, and there are legitimate nontax reasons
for its use. It was thus incumbent on the IRS to come
up with a more definite approach that would per-
mit partners to allocate nonrecourse deductions,
and indeed, the regulations provide a safe harbor.
The cornerstone of the safe harbor is the fact that
when there are nonrecourse deductions, there is
also minimum gain. The Supreme Court held in
Tufts143 that if a taxpayer sells or disposes of prop-
erty encumbered by nonrecourse debt, the amount
realized includes the amount of that debt. Thus, at
a minimum, the taxpayer must recognize taxable
gain to the extent that the encumbering nonrecourse
debt exceeds the taxpayer’s basis in the property.
135Reg. section 1.704-2(b)(1).
136See Crane, 331 U.S. 1.
137See reg. section 1.704-2(c).
138As I discussed earlier in this report, it may be possible for
creditors to be third-party beneficiaries of DROs created by
recourse debt. But it is unlikely that a creditor could be a
third-party beneficiary of a DRO created by nonrecourse debt
because that would have the effect of making a nonrecourse
debt recourse.
139If recourse debt is also used, deductions attributable to the
recourse debt can also have economic effect.
140Reg. section 1.704-2(b)(1).
141The regulations use book value rather than tax basis if
there is a book-tax disparity, but in this example book value and
tax basis are the same. See reg. section 1.704-2(d)(3).
142Reg. section 1.704-1(b)(3).
143Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
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Indeed, on any taxable disposition of property
subject to nonrecourse debt, this excess is the mini-
mum gain that a taxpayer will have to recognize.
Although A and B may not be required to restore
the deficits in their capital accounts, it is still
possible to bring their capital accounts back to at
least zero. This is done by allocating minimum gain
to each partner in an amount at least sufficient to
bring the capital account to zero. In the example, if
AB Partnership defaults on the loan after the first
year, the partnership and its two partners have
$20,000 gain on the foreclosure ($200,000 debt mi-
nus $180,000 basis). Allocating that gain equally to
A and B brings their capital accounts back to zero.
Thus, if allocations of nonrecourse deductions are
made and the basis of the property is reduced
below the amount of the debt, we can commonly be
assured that at some point there will be compensat-
ing minimum gain. Generally, the regulations allow
allocations of nonrecourse deductions to a partner
as long as an equal amount of minimum gain is
allocated to that partner (this minimum gain is
unrecognized but inherent in the property).144 Fur-
ther, partners may generally have negative capital
accounts, even if they do not have DROs, to the
extent of their shares of minimum gain. There can
be a genuine economic impact to this minimum
gain. If the only gain recognized is the amount of
the minimum gain, no cash will be going to the
taxpayer, and he will have to reach into his pocket
to pay the taxes on the minimum gain (income
without cash is sometimes called ‘‘phantom in-
come’’).
Because the allocation of deductions attributable
to nonrecourse debt cannot have economic effect,
the regulations provide that they must be allocated
in accordance with the partners’ interests in the
partnership.145 The regulations provide a complex
safe harbor that contains several specialized terms.
Partnership minimum gain is determined by com-
puting for each partnership nonrecourse liability
any gain the partnership would realize if it dis-
posed of the property subject to that liability for no
consideration other than the full satisfaction of the
liability — in other words, the amount by which the
nonrecourse liabilities exceed the property’s ba-
sis.146
The amount of nonrecourse deductions for a
partnership tax year equals the net increase in
partnership minimum gain during that year.147 In
the example above, if the property generates
$20,000 of depreciation deductions in the first year
and there are no other expenses for the property, the
property’s basis is reduced by $20,000, meaning that
the increase in partnership minimum gain is also
$20,000. It went from zero to $20,000. Note that the
partnership can have nonrecourse debt without
creating nonrecourse deductions. Until there is
minimum gain, any deductions are considered to
come from the equity in the property.148 Nonre-
course deductions are created when the partnership
generates minimum gain. Nonrecourse deductions
and minimum gain are two sides of one coin.
Nonrecourse deductions consist first of deprecia-
tion deductions for property that is subject to non-
recourse debt and then, generally, of pro rata
portions of the partnership’s other deductions and
section 705(a)(2)(B) expenditures.149
Despite the lack of economic effect, the regula-
tions provide a safe harbor under which the alloca-
tion of nonrecourse deductions will be allowed150:
1. The partnership must comply with the eco-
nomic effect test discussed earlier. Recall that
part 3 of that test requires a partner to either
have an unlimited DRO or meet the qualified
income offset rules. Also, recall that under the
qualified income offset rules, a partner may
have a deficit capital account to the extent of
any limited DRO. Partnerships using nonre-
course debt commonly do not have DROs. The
nonrecourse deduction rules allow for deficit
capital accounts despite the lack of a DRO to
the extent of a partner’s share of minimum
gain. The qualified income offset rules provide
that partners may have negative capital ac-
counts to the extent of their shares of mini-
mum gain. A partner’s share of minimum gain
is considered a limited DRO for purposes of
the qualified income offset rules.151
2. Beginning in the first tax year of the part-
nership in which there are nonrecourse deduc-
tions and thereafter throughout the full term
of the partnership, the partnership agreement
must provide for allocations of nonrecourse
deductions in a manner that is ‘‘reasonably
consistent’’ with allocations of some other
144Technically, the regulations provide that if the allocation of
nonrecourse deductions is in accordance with the regulatory
rules, it will also be in accordance with the partner’s interest in
the partnership. Reg. section 1.704-2(b)(1).
145Reg. section 1.704-2(b)(1).
146Or book value if different from tax basis. Reg. section
1.704-2(d)(1), (3). Section 704(c) governs book-tax disparities.
147Reg. section 1.704-2(c). This is reduced by any distribu-
tions of nonrecourse liabilities that are attributable to an in-
crease in minimum gain. Increases in partnership minimum
gain resulting from conversions, refinancing, and other changes
to the debt instrument do not generate nonrecourse deductions.
148Reg. section 1.704-2(c).
149Reg. section 1.704-2(j)(1).
150Reg. section 1.704-2(e).
151Reg. section 1.704-2(g)(1).
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT
1128 TAX NOTES, August 22, 2016
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
(C) Tax Analysts 2016. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
significant partnership item attributable to the
property securing the nonrecourse liabilities
that has substantial economic effect.
3. The partnership must have a minimum gain
chargeback provision, discussed below.
4. The partnership must otherwise comply
with the regulatory rules for allocations.
Eventually, minimum gain inherent in partner-
ship property will be reduced. The partnership
might sell the underlying property (meaning the
associated minimum gain drops to zero), or it might
pay down some or all of the nonrecourse debt. Of
course, the key item that has been driving this
whole allocation system is that there is minimum
gain available to offset the nonrecourse deductions.
What does the partnership do when the minimum
gain goes down? The regulations provide that at
that time there is a minimum gain chargeback,
meaning that the partners must be allocated items
of income and gain equal to their shares of the net
decrease in minimum gain.152 Of course, if the
partnership sells the underlying property (or has it
taken in foreclosure), finding the gain will not be a
problem. The gain from the sale or foreclosure will
be available for this purpose. Indeed, the regula-
tions provide that any minimum gain chargeback
must consist first of gains recognized from the
disposition of partnership property subject to part-
nership nonrecourse liabilities. But if there is no
such disposition gain because, for example, the
reduction in minimum gain resulted from paying
down the debt, the partnership must allocate a pro
rata portion of the partnership’s other items of
income and gain to the partners to offset the drop in
minimum gain. If insufficient income and gain are
available in the year in which the drop in minimum
gain occurs, the allocations continue in future years
until the full offset has been made. This minimum
gain chargeback allocation is made before any other
section 704 allocations.153
What is a partner’s share of partnership mini-
mum gain? Generally, it is the sum of the nonre-
course deductions allocated to the partner, net of
prior minimum gain chargebacks.154
152Reg. section 1.704-2(f)(1).
153Reg. section 1.704-2(j).
154Reg. section 1.704-2(g)(1).
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